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THE EFFECT ON AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF A POWERFUL MILITARY AND NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT

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Of all the novel and perplexing problems which have been fastened on the American nation by the proposal to make a very large increase in its military and naval armament, there is none which bristles with more difficulties than the subject on which I am addressing you this morning. What will be the effect on American domestic life and institutions of a more efficient, expensive and powerful military and naval establishment?

Americans who are opposing "preparedness" are basing their opposition largely upon the havoc which it is expected to work in our traditional internal order. Americans who are advocating "preparedness" are basing their approval largely upon the better order, which it is expected to impose upon our time-honored internal chaos. Americans who are hesitating are basing their hesitation largely upon misgivings as to the wisdom of exposing American institutions and life to the corrosive effect of such a dubious and perilous innovation. These are the questions which American public opinion is considering most anxiously and with the smallest prospect of future agreement. The country is not thinking so much about what we can and should do with a larger army and navy. It is thinking rather about what a larger army and navy may or will do to us.

Preoccupation with the domestic effects of military preparedness presided at its official birth. Last summer when President Wilson decided to include in the legislative program of the administration provision for a large army he ordered his Secretary of War to make the plans for an increase conforming to the existing American military tradition. What the President had in mind is clear. He had decided that more soldiers must be enlisted and trained presumably because they might be needed for certain practical purposes. But after having reached this decision he was

chiefly preoccupied, not with the number and kind of soldiers demanded by these practical needs, but with the effect of any increase at all upon the opinions and traditions of his fellow-countrymen. He knew his proposals would meet with lively opposition based chiefly on the presumptive un-Americanism of large armies, and he preferred to bestow on the plans of the administration not so much the positive merit of careful adaptation to the practical need as the negative merit of conformity to a prevailing tradition. In order to make them politically acceptable the administration plans should look unoffensive and not too unfamiliar. The American army had always been the creature of domestic political policy and so it must remain.

In adopting this course President Wilson was behaving like a shrewd and cautious political leader. It was the course calculated to effect a certain result with the smallest friction. He has been rewarded by the practical collapse of the opposition to his program. It has been an adroit achievement and an important success. But the fullest possible recognition of the achievement should not blind us to the disadvantages of the method. The success was purchased by a lack of thoroughness in framing the details of the plans and by a lack of frankness in explaining their meaning and consequences. The technical obstacles to adequate preparation and its political penalties and dangers have been underestimated and evaded rather than courageously confronted and definitely overcome. As a result the American people are acting in a grave national crisis without any sufficient understanding of the bearing of the new policy on their past and its probable effects on their future.

The American tradition of military organization and policy which President Wilson wished to preserve was not on its merits worth so much anxious solicitude. It called for a small standing professional army which was really no more than a national police force. Its members, organization and equipment were not adjusted to a foreign policy or an international condition. Invasion was not considered a danger against which any elaborate precautions needed to be taken. In the event of war the navy would act as a screen, behind which could be trained around a nucleus furnished by the state militia a volunteer citizens' army. The aspect of this system which Mr. Wilson probably considered most precious was its

underlying and almost complete civilianism. It included a professional army, to be sure, but only in insignificant numbers. The United States depended ultimately for its soldiers upon its citizens and it had consequently no reason to fear the corruption of its democratic institutions and ideals by a military caste or spirit. All this is true, but it is also true that the system was a tissue of inadequacies and contradictions. It evaded every difficulty and ignored every serious responsibility involved by military preparedness.

A democracy should depend ultimately for its soldiers on its citizens; but our traditional system only pretended to create an armed citizenry. Its trained soldiers were prevented from being citizens; its citizens were never sufficiently trained to be good soldiers. The American people had no reason to fear their army, but neither had the possible enemies of the American people. It was not intended to be dangerous to anybody but a few foreign or domestic marauders. Congress always refused to incorporate in it a coherent formative idea. It was partly professional and partly amateur, partly under national and partly under state jurisdiction, partly based upon the idea of service and partly upon an appeal to mercenary motives. But above all it was wholly and intentionally innocuous. It was essentially an attempt to assure civilian control over the military machine less by making the civil authority strong, clear-sighted, able and worthy, than by making the army feeble and incompetent.

If, as President Wilson decided last summer, the American democracy was finally faced by the necessity of seriously preparing during peace for the possibility of war, this national tradition in military organization needed to be radically modified rather than loyally cherished and preserved. The traditional military system can be fairly characterized as organized unpreparedness. Americans had believed themselves immune from the grim necessity of anticipating and providing either against social evils at home or the defense of national policies abroad. America was the promised land precisely because it was delivered from such moral and physical stresses and from the structural reinforcement, necessary to withstand them. Some years ago one-half of these expectations began to be abandoned. It became only too apparent that American domestic economy is not a stream which purified itself in the running.

It had developed the same social disorders as the older European societies and similar precautions must be taken against them. The decision to increase the army and navy means the abandonment also of the other half. The organized unpreparedness of our military system had been based upon a conception of international relationships and of ensuing American dangers, opportunities and responsibilities which had ceased to be true. The indispensable condition of any effective military preparation was a declaration of war against an essential aspect of the very tradition which the President was seeking so sedulously to preserve.

In so far as the American tradition in military organization consisted in the strict and absolute subordination of the military and naval machines to ultimate civilian control and their employment for valid political purposes, every good American will attach the utmost importance to its preservation. But in so far as the civilian control was obtained by paralyzing the army rather than by organizing the nation, strengthening its government and clarifying its policy, the existing tradition manifestly constitutes an insuperable obstacle to effective military preparation. The larger army and navy must be intended and made ready for actual definite service. In so far as it is ready for specific service the army must be a dangerous weapon. It must be dangerous to the possible enemies of the United States; and it must be dangerous to our traditional internal equilibrium. Unless the American people are willing and ready to create a powerful weapon, which if misused would prove to be harmful to them no less than to their possible enemies, the money and energy spent on military preparations will continue to be a colossal waste. As a matter of fact the American people proved more willing to create a powerful weapon than its chosen leaders imagined. The original program of the administration was indeed framed to look innocuous rather than dangerous. It was based chiefly upon the principle of amplifying our deficiencies. But the original program has been radically modified, and every modification has tended to make it less innocuous and more dangerous. A reluctant Democratic administration and Congress, which had every disposition to keep down the scope and cost of military "preparedness," have been forced by the logic of their own decision to build very much more than they intended. The final legislation is likely to provide for a really formidable fighting force—one which

will be measurably adjusted in size, training and equipment to the probable needs of national policy.

The outstanding fact in the proposed military re-organization is the increase in the professional standing army. In the original plan little attempt was made to convert the regular army into a force which was capable of defending the territory of the United States against invasion or promoting its policies abroad. That task was reserved for a body of national militia which was subsequently modified by the House Committee into a body of "federalized" state militia. But the more these bodies of militia were examined the more untrustworthy they looked; and the more public opinion came to favor an increase in the regular army as the one really dependable military force. The regular army is being increased until with its own automatically created reserve, it may, if it can be recruited, afford a sufficient protection against invasion, and protection against invasion is what the public and the military experts have on the tops of their minds. But merely as a consequence of organizing an effective army for defense Congress has done very much more. It has organized an army which may also constitute a formidable aggressive force. Instead of creating as the President and the Democratic leaders intended, a safe and a sane army, they are being driven to create a really dangerous army—a professional force, as far as possible removed from the conception of an armed citizenry.

The new American army will be unsafe for two reasons. An army of this kind is really adapted chiefly to service abroad and consequently to something more than a defensive foreign policy. It is also the kind of an army which will have a profound reaction on American domestic life, because as a consequence of its increased size and authority it will be constantly making imperative demands upon the civil authorities which they will be reluctant to grant and which will raise the issue between civil and military control over American policy. These are precisely the questions which the President wished to avoid, as they have been avoided in the past, but from now on they will wax increasingly troublesome. The new army could not be made serviceable, without becoming unsafe, because in the opinion of too many American citizens, a safe army meant an imperilled country. In truth there was no way in which the domestic life and institutions of the nation could be guaranteed against

far-reaching modifications as a consequence of substituting organized preparedness for organized unpreparedness. An efficient new military and naval establishment is bound in the end to do something important to the American people, and the certainty of a drastic result should be recognized in advance. Confident prophecies are being made as to what this drastic result will be. Many good Americans predict that our democracy will be ruined by their new and dangerous servant. Others predict with equal confidence that a more powerful army and widespread military training is necessary not merely to save the nation from its possible foreign enemies but to preserve it from its domestic infirmities. Neither of these predictions need be taken too seriously. They are the expression of fears and hopes rather than a disinterested estimate of the action of social forces. Although drastic result will certainly follow, what that result will be is by no means so certain. It will depend less upon the size and organization of the army and the navy than upon the way in which the nation decides to use them.

At present the American people have not made up their mind how they will use their new army and navy, and anti-militarists are insisting that the creation of the larger army and navy should be postponed until they do. I cannot agree with them. We shall have to take the risk of preparing first and of deciding later just what we are preparing for. To have refused to prepare would under the circumstances have been an indication of inertia and weakness. To have begun to prepare is on the whole a symptom of self-confidence. It indicated that the country is not afraid to plunge forward even though somewhat blindly and to risk the assumption of a perilous and costly responsibility which before it is redeemed may diminish many prescriptive rights, damage many vested interests and perhaps change the whole outlook of the American democracy.

The American nation needs the tonic of a serious moral adventure. It has been too safe, too comfortable, too complacent and too relaxed. Its besetting weakness is the prevalence of individual and collective irresponsibility, based on the expectation of accomplishing without effort. Living as it did in a favored land which was not exposed to attack from without and which offered to good Americans surpassing opportunities to satisfy their own special and individual purposes, our democracy has not been required to pull

itself together. It has depended for its cohesion upon loyalty to an achieved and essentially complete constitutional system, and upon a suppositious harmony between individual or local, and public or national interests. Unlike European countries, it could afford to leave the satisfaction of many public objects to the results of an accidental concert among individuals, groups of individuals, or local political units. It has been reluctant to create powerful political or economic organs for the accomplishment of its national purposes, and when instruments of this kind came into existence as the result of automatic economic and political forces, the instinct of the democracy was to dissolve, rather than to discipline and use its own unmanageable servants. It has not liked the responsibility of turning such potentially dangerous agents as a centralized administration, an authoritative legislature, an efficient army or any concentrated embodiment of industrial power to beneficial public use.

Because of its reluctance to create organs for the accomplishment of peculiarly important public purposes, the American democracy has always been burdened by a huge amount of improvidence and incompetence. In the beginning conditions did not demand the creation of political, economic and social agents powerful enough to be dangerous to the whole community; and when conditions changed it did not sufficiently care or dare to organize them. The need first arose from the necessity of providing administrative and legislative corrections to the enormous power which the trusts and the party machines had obtained as the result of a combination between professional politics and organized business. Much legislative and administrative action has followed but up to date the attempts to deal with the evils resulting from the concentration of business and political power in irresponsible private hands have been at least partly frustrated, because of the reluctance of the American people to consent to any similarly effective organization of public power. In a sense the American democracy has connived at its own political and economic exploitation. So many excellent voters were profiting in petty ways from the laxity, the waste, the irresponsible individualism of the prevailing system that they would do nothing effective to reconstruct it. In a kindred spirit many of the people who are now either opposing military preparations or are trying to kill it by lukewarm concessions are all

doing so, not merely because they are afraid of militarism, but because they shrink from imposing on the voters the heavy obligation of making really good use of such an exacting and dangerous instrument. They fail to see that dangerous situations require dangerous remedies, the need for which cannot be exercised merely by refusing to admit the existence or the seriousness of the problem itself. The propensity to underestimate the seriousness of its own problems and to meet grave issues with petty half-measures is the most insidious and stubborn enemy of the advance of the American people towards an improved political and social condition.

The advocates of military preparedness are, I think, justified in anticipating that an army and a navy large enough to be dangerous may introduce into American domestic life a useful ferment—one which may prove hostile to the prevalent spirit of complacent irresponsibility. The representatives of the older tradition have been trying to satisfy the demand for military and naval reorganization by the same kind of half-measures with which they have been satisfying the demand for administrative and social reorganization. But their partial defeat is significant. Our domestic institutions and policy will and should be subjected to a strain by military preparedness, severe enough to compel their modification and readjustment. The national spirit must rise to the occasion. If the nation had stuck to the method of democratizing the army by keeping it feeble and inefficient a profoundly disintegrating agitation would have certainly followed. The demand for military preparedness cannot be shirked with the same apparent impunity as the demand for social preparedness. The most conspicuous aspect of the progressive movement during the past fifteen years has been the contrast between the enormous effort and the meagre results. Progressivism gradually became a new expression of American extravagance—an opportunity of subjecting the moral and intellectual resources of the nation to the kind of conspicuous waste which has been dissipating our natural resources. The most serious danger to the work of military preparedness has been that it would follow the same path and arrange for the expenditure of a few hundred of millions of dollars a year more without providing any really trustworthy instrument of national defense or of an enlightened foreign policy.

In the case of military preparedness the danger brings with it a better chance of being remedied. If a larger American army and navy are really needed, their efficiency is a matter of national life and death. Any clear evidence of laxity, neglect and waste can be used to stir up a troublesome popular excitement. Congress will be under constant pressure to improve the operation and the equipment of the new military organ, and, as a consequence of being obliged to do so, it will be similarly pressed to correct its legislative methods and clarify its political policies. It cannot eliminate the waste from such an important department of government work without subjecting itself to a certain amount of internal reorganization. A really efficient army and navy is too finely tempered an instrument to be merely tacked on to the unwieldy administrative system of today. It cannot be created and operated without the adoption of legislative methods, which will provide for the increase of discretion and independence so much needed by all the administrative departments of the central government and for the promotion of improved methods of conducting public business. The conduct of an army and navy is, of course, the supreme example of pure administration. Any deficiency of resources, any division of responsibility or authority, any neglect of preliminary research, or any infirmity of purpose would be perilous if not fatal to its successful functioning. The need of so nicely adjusted an organ will always be a thorn in the side of that Congress which attempts to dictate administrative action in detail instead of being content with controlling its policy and criticising its operations. If the advocates of preparedness propose to create an organ of this kind they can scarcely stop short of insisting on an executive budget, and in general the whole program which reformers have been urging for the purpose of emancipating the work of administration from an unnecessary and injurious legislative interference.

The foregoing is only one illustration of the tonic effect which the attempt to create an efficient and dangerous army may have upon American domestic institutions. It has become a commonplace that changes may be brought about in the American financial and industrial organization. The expense of the new army and navy will be sufficiently heavy to force the reconsideration of the system of national taxation and to change its adjustment to the tax system of the various states. The industrial fabric may have

to submit to a corresponding modification. Of late years progressives have been asking with increasing insistence how far the professions, the railroads and the industries of the country were organized and operated chiefly for the national service or chiefly for private and local service. The same questions will now be put by the advocates of military preparedness. The European war has proved sufficiently the impossibility of seriously preparing for a possible war without calling upon the whole industrial system for assistance. If the American industrial system is not prepared to render that assistance promptly and completely, the country would be unprepared for serious military or naval operations—no matter how well its soldiers were trained and equipped.

Of even more importance to adequate preparedness than these measures of political, financial and industrial reorganization is an effective method of securing for the new military and naval program the support of the wage-earners. In the event of a war which involved the national safety they could be counted on to volunteer in sufficient numbers; but that is not the question. Assuming that the United States is to have an army, which even in the times of peace will require of an increasing proportion of the wage-earners of the country a certain share of their time and labor, how can they be induced to give what is needed? It is the answer to this question which will arouse in the near future the most lively controversy, and upon the way it is answered will largely depend the reaction of a larger military and naval establishment upon American domestic institutions and life. In the past the government has relied for the recruits to the army and the navy upon the expedient of tempting men to volunteer, but if this expedient is to succeed in the future, the temptation will have to be very much increased. It is doubtful whether the new army can be recruited, save at an excessive cost. For this and for many other reasons an aggressive and insistent element in public opinion is demanding the substitution of compulsion for the volunteer principle.

The agitation for compulsory military service bears particularly hard on the subject under discussion, because the arguments in favor of compulsion are derived from social and political rather than military sources. It is not pretended that the nation needs the military service of all the young men of America; but it is claimed that the young men of America need the benefit of military service.

Instead of as at present paying some young men to enter an essentially public occupation, they wish the burden and the opportunity of the employment to be imposed on all alike, without fear and without favor. That is the way really to democratize the American army. Universal service raises American citizens of all classes and sections, if not of both sexes, to the level of an irksome common obligation; and this obligation brings with it to an extent which political and social obligations do not, the occasion for common association. The experience would enable the young soldier to realize how far he is a member of a community and how much fellowship in the community means. It is the real solution of the ideal in an armed citizenry. The nation would obtain soldiers who were citizens and citizens who were soldiers.

The argument of those Americans, who are seeking to give a positive social value to the military system and convert it into a source of national unity, culminates in the foregoing contention. Instead of considering the army as a troublesome excrescence on American life, they propose to work it into the very fabric of the nation. It is to be made the heroic remedy for the insidious disease of national incoherence. By being universalized, military service is converted into a most effective form of compulsory national education. American citizens will be pulled together by the force of active comradeship in common labor and genuine sacrifices for the national welfare.

The idea of making the military system contribute something of positive value in the domestic life of the country is sound, but it breaks down when worked as hard as it is by the advocates of compulsory service. They are following the bad example of the traditional American democrats in insisting that the size of the military establishment should be determined by its expected reaction on American domestic life. The traditional democrats were reluctant to let the nation have as many soldiers or as much military training as might be needed, because they presupposed a necessary antagonism between democracy and military preparation. The contemporary advocates of universal service seek the enlistment and training of more soldiers than are needed, because they believe that the American who has undergone military training will constitute a better rather than a worse citizen. Both of them are falling into the mistake so common to golf players of keeping their eye too much

upon the hole and not enough upon the ball. The former have more fear of military training than they have confidence in democracy; the latter have more confidence in military training than they have confidence in democracy. Both need to understand that an army is one thing and a democracy is another. An army is a delicate and dangerous instrument which may be called upon to perform the terrible work of killing and submitting to being killed and which needs to be adjusted to the probable nature and amount of this work. A democracy is a form of political and social organization, which, because it fastens on the whole people ultimate responsibility for the public welfare, depends for its fulfillment upon the ability of men to rise to higher opportunities. The two are not divided by any necessary incompatibility, and it would be a timid and rudimentary democracy which tied itself to a policy of mis-armament merely because it is afraid to let enough of its citizens become properly trained soldiers. But if the two are not divided by any incompatibility neither are they tied together by mutual dependence. While a democracy may obtain incidental educational benefits from universal military training, only an impoverished democracy would rely upon compulsory military service for the education of its citizens in the essentials of citizenship. The American army will never be brought into wholesome relations with the American democracy until we cease to consider it either as a bogey or as a vehicle of civic grace. It is primarily a machine, planned and prepared to accomplish some desperately important and extremely hazardous practical work.

The reaction of a large army upon the moral integrity of a democracy depends in some measure upon its size and its method of being recruited but still more upon the purposes for which the citizens are asked to undergo military service. When in 1848 the American army was employed in conquering Mexican territory, its insignificant size and its volunteer origin did not prevent it from doing harm to the morale of the country. The compulsory enlistment of a large part of the manhood of the North during the Civil War ultimately strengthened the morale of the American nation, because its citizens killed and submitted to being killed for the realization of a binding and leavening political and social ideal. An army of any size and character can have a demoralizing effect upon the national life in case it is asked to do predatory work, while an army of the same size can add something fine and noble to the national

moral consciousness, in case it is pressed into the service of an enlightened national policy.

Thus we get back to the idea which has already been approached from a somewhat different road. The American army cannot be made democratic by keeping it weak and disorganized; but neither can it be democratized by merging the nation into the army. Not until we know what kind of a policy the larger army and navy will be required to serve, can we tell whether or not its adventure in military preparedness will ultimately be a uniting or a dividing influence in American domestic life.

The usual explanation that the United States is preparing only for defense, which is a policy on which all good citizens can agree, merely begs the question. A nation like Switzerland may arm purely for defense, because a small nation even if armed to the teeth is incapable of aggression, and because it cannot have an enemy of any size, which would not be large enough to threaten its independence; but in the case of a wealthy, populous and geographically isolated nation like the United States no sharp line can be drawn between defensive and aggressive armament. As has been frequently pointed out, the new army and navy will be required to defend a policy rather than merely a coast line. If the United States is invaded the invasion will originate not in a wanton attack from a strong military and naval power, but in a clash with a similar power over a difference of opinion about neutral rights at sea, the Open Door in China or the Monroe Doctrine in South America. In the event of such a quarrel there is really little difference between fighting to defend a policy and fighting to promote it. The Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door are from certain points of view aggressive policies, about the meaning and justice of which wide differences of opinion may exist both in this and in other countries. Hence what we need most of all to understand is the nature and scope of the policies in the interest of which we shall organize an efficient and dangerous army and navy. Until this is known not only can we not calculate how many and what kind of sailors and soldiers we may need and what sacrifices the American people may fairly be asked to make for them, but we shall be equally at a loss to estimate the moral and political reaction of the military preparations upon American domestic life.

Thus the dubious aspect of the existing situation does not consist in the fact or in the cost of preparedness but in the ambiguity of its underlying purposes. The American people are being asked to pay heavily in labor and money for a new army and navy as a weapon of self-defence, because only in this way can contentious matters be avoided and a sufficiently general measure of popular support be frightened into existence. Yet there is a very real probability that the new army and navy will be used chiefly for positive and for aggressive as opposed to merely defensive purposes. These positive purposes can be made in my opinion even more justifiable than a negative defensive policy, but their value and meaning is obscured because they are not frankly admitted, fully discussed and sufficiently defined. As long as they remain ambiguous and obscure, they create and encourage a dangerously suspicious and evasive attitude towards the question of preparedness. The socialists are already declaring that the new army and navy are intended as the instruments of imperialistic exploitation in Mexico and Central America, and the accusation cannot be answered either by silence or abuse. As a matter of fact if the soldiers which will be recruited and trained for the new army see active service anywhere they are more likely to see it, just as the old army has, outside rather than inside of the United States. The service beyond the seas may be susceptible of complete justification as a matter of democratic national policy, but it cannot be justified as a matter of self-defense, and only gradually will it be met with the same general approval and support as would an exclusively defensive service.

So we get back to the consideration which has been implicit in this whole discussion. The probable reaction of military preparedness upon American domestic life and institutions will be determined finally by the ability of the nation to assimilate the dangerous, unmanageable and exacting intruder into its moral organization. The work of assimilation depends in part upon our ability to create an army and a navy whose officers and enlisted men do not cease to participate in the civilian occupations and interests, yet who at the same time are not prevented by civilian meddling from doing thoroughly well their own special work. But it depends still more upon the national policy of which the new army and navy will be the chief instrument. In creating such an instrument the American nation is not submitting itself passively to the benign

influence of a militaristic Saint Michael. Neither is it submitting itself passively to the malign influence of a militaristic dragon. Neither is it pursuing a course which like the menace in the army and the navy after the Spanish American war, will leave its domestic life and institutions practically unchanged. What it is doing is to adopt a new and hazardous course, which in case it is to be successfully carried through will require certain radical changes in the intellectual and normal make-up of the American democracy.

The good American should consequently neither denounce nor glorify military preparedness. He should rather do what he can to make the country equal to its newly assumed responsibilities. The probability is that the effect of the adventure will be disastrous unless the American people can improve their political and economic organization, socialize their industries and convert their educational system into a source of democratic citizenship. Efficient and elaborate military preparations will neither prevent us from making these improvements nor assure their attainment. They must be obtained, if at all, on their own merits and by a sufficient concentration of purpose and effort upon special jobs, each in their turn. What the work of military preparation may do is to help the American people obtain the habit of concentrated attention upon their own collective tasks. As a result of an increase in concentration they should be able to rise more completely both to their obligations and opportunities, but no such result necessarily follows. It all depends upon the national policies, domestic and foreign, in the interest of which the fruits of concentration are used.

The decision to prepare, consequently, decided very little. The larger army and navy will of itself bring neither ruin nor regeneration to the American people. It will not even bring additional security, for security is a matter of comparative rather than actual armament. By deciding to prepare the American nation has merely issued a challenge to itself to use more foresight, more intelligence, and more purpose in the management of its affairs. Its more powerful army and navy like its more energetic and efficient government must be made the organ of a policy, which will consciously and tenaciously make for individual and social betterment. Such a policy has not yet been completely formulated, but the experiments and the discussions of the past year have indicated the direction in which it must be sought. All Americans who wish the national military and naval

establishment to be a boon rather than a curse to their country should turn their attention to the business of formulating it. The foreign policy of a democracy can be democratized only as a result of a sufficient measure of popular understanding and goodwill; and upon the democratizing of American foreign policy will depend the democratizing of its most dangerous organ,—a large and powerful military and naval establishment.